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ABSTRACT
Reliability and fault tolerance are critical attributes of embedded cyber-physical systems that require
a high safety-integrity level. For such systems, the use of formal functional safety specifications has
been strongly advocated in most industrial safety standards, but reliability and fault tolerance have
traditionally been treated as platform issues. We believe that addressing reliability and fault tolerance
at the functional safety level widens the scope for resource optimization, targeting those function-
alities that are safety-critical, rather than the entire platform. Moreover, for software based control
functionalities, temporal redundancies have become just as important as replication of physical re-
sources, and such redundancies can be modeled at the functional specification level. The ability
to formally model functional reliability at a specification level enables early estimation of physical
resources and computation bandwidth requirements. In this paper we propose, for the first time, a
resource estimation methodology from a formal functional safety specification augmented by relia-
bility annotations. The proposed reliability specification is overlaid on the safety-critical functional
specification and our methodology extracts a constraint satisfaction problem for determining the op-
timal set of resources for meeting the reliability target for the safety-critical behaviors. We use SMT
(Satisfiability Modulo Theories) / ILP (Integer Linear Programming) solvers at the back end to solve
the optimization problem, and demonstrate the feasibility of our methodology on a Satellite Launch
Vehicle Navigation, Guidance and Control (NGC) System.
Keywords Formal Specification, Resource Allocation, Processor Minimization
1 Introduction
With increasing dependence of safety-critical systems on software and embedded computing, the notions of reliability
and fault tolerance have undergone a paradigm shift. While the traditional approach for enhancing reliability in electro-
mechanical systems is based on replication of physical components [21, 24, 32, 39, 3, 30], safety-critical embedded
cyber-physical systems (CPS) must also consider reliability of software executions, packet drops in networks, priority
inversion in scheduling of control tasks on shared processors, and many other factors which are attributed to the
computational platform which executes the cyber part of the system [7, 28].
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In the domain of cyber-physical systems, reliability targets of embedded control can be met through fault-tolerant
design of the underlying platform and its structural components or through fault-tolerant deployment of the control
software on the underlying platform. The former looks at the necessary resource requirements for providing reliable
service at the platform level without specific focus on individual control components [4]. For example, while designing
the CAN matrix for an automobile, we choose the topology and number of CAN segments depending on the overall
loading of the buses and the reliability concerns thereof. On the other hand, fault-tolerant deployment of control fo-
cuses on individual control tasks [15]. For example, it includes replication of software tasks on multiple cores [38] and
sometimes on the same core (temporal redundancy) [14, 26, 23, 25], or provides fault-tolerant scheduling frameworks
that involve cloning of a sequence of tasks for layered task graphs [10, 37]. Fault-tolerant deployment also influences
the choice of the platform and its components, but with respect to the reliability requirements for individual functional
components.
The design cycle of cyber-physical systems begin with the preparation of a specification of the functionalities of the
system. The use of formal specifications for defining the functional safety properties of such systems has been widely
recommended in most industrial standards, including aeronautics (DO-178C), automotive (ISO 26262), industrial pro-
cess automation (IEC 61508), nuclear (IEC 60880), railway (EN 50128) and space (ECSS-Q-ST-80C), specifically for
those functionalities that require a high safety-integrity level. Although reliability and fault tolerance are as important
attributes of the system design as functional correctness [6, 8, 9, 11, 27, 34], or performance attributes such as tim-
ing [1, 2, 12, 13, 33], power [17, 18] and security [22], formal specification of reliability, especially with respect to the
critical functional safety properties has so far received very little attention. This is largely due to the perception that
reliability and fault tolerance need to be addressed at the platform level, not at the functional level [20, 40]. On the
other hand, we believe that with the increasing cost of electronics and software in cyber-physical systems, investment
on reliability needs to be prioritized on the basis of the safety-criticality of the system’s functions.
This paper presents, for the first time, a methodology for overlaying formal functional safety specifications with relia-
bility annotations and estimating the resource requirement from such extended specifications. A formal specification
enables the designer to lay out the strategy for redundant computations and/or actuations [16] and obtain a formal
reliability guarantee for the strategy using the proposed method of analysis. Moreover since this is done at the spec-
ification level, our methodology provides early estimates of the resource requirements, thereby facilitating design
space exploration, where the tradeoff between reliability and resource requirements can be studied using the proposed
methodology until an acceptable balance is achieved.
In particular, our previous work [16] explores various reliable strategies enabled by the given reliability specifications
and converges on a strategy that maximizes the reliability – thereby also pointing out whether the specified relia-
bility targets are attainable for every functionality of the design. In our level of abstraction, an action represents a
discrete control event which is enabled by a logically defined pre-condition (sense) and achieves a logically specified
consequent (outcome) when executed successfully on the underlying computational platform. We use the term action-
strategy to denote possible sequences of actions that lead to some desired outcome. An action-strategy is admissible
with respect to a reliability target, if the sequence and timing of actions involved in that strategy guarantees the desired
outcome with the specified reliability guarantee. It may be noted that, more than one admissible action-strategies
may exist for a functionality and every participating action (at any time instant) in an admissible strategy requires one
processor (computing resource) to execute.
In the early stage of design of a complex, multi-component embedded control system, the designer must plan the
sense-control-actuation steps for each control loop along with the corresponding timing constraints. The formal safety
specification at this stage defines the necessary outcomes of the closed loop system as a timed function of the sensed
input events. For example, we may be given a safety property of the form:
sense_A → ##[1 : 10] outcome_B
where sense_A is a sense event and outcome_B is the desired outcome which must happen within the time interval
[1:10] following the sense event. Now in order to ensure that outcome_B does actually happen in that window of
time, the control system must perform appropriate actions (called actuations).
Suppose we have an action, called action_C which can cause outcome_B, but the causality is not fully guaranteed.
Suppose:
Prob(outcome_B | action_C) = 0.8
which means that action_C, if used, can cause outcome_B 80% of the time. Now suppose our reliability target for
the above safety property is 0.95. If the sense event, sense_A, triggers one execution of the action, action_C, then
the reliability with which outcome_B is guaranteed is only 0.8. Therefore, in order to achieve the target of 0.95, we
must be prepared to repeat action_C more than once, either on different resources, or on the same resource but at
different times. Moreover, all executions must be completed within the specified window of time, namely [1:10],
following the event sense_A.
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In a complex system, there can be many safety properties and therefore, many different actions may have to be repeated
spatially and/or temporally to achieve the desired reliability. We provide a framework, where the system designer can
overlay a chosen pattern of redundancy over the temporal fabric of the safety specification. For example, consider the
following specification:
sense_A → ##[2 : 5] action_C[∼ 2] ##[1 : 2] action_C
The above specification specifies that following a sense_A event, the action, action_C, will be executed in parallel
at some time in the window [2:5], and will be again executed after [1 : 2] units of time. It be noted that all three
executions of action_C are constrained by time windows, but they can be executed in more than one way within the
specified windows. A formal specification framework like this has two immediate advantages:
1. We can verify whether the specified redundancy in the executions of the actions achieves the target reliability
of the safety properties.
2. Each possible schedules of the actions provides us an early estimate of the resource requirements. We can
also find the schedule which has the optimal resource requirement. In a complex system, with many actions
and replications, this is a non-trivial task and computationally beyond manual capacity.
It may also be noted that two admissible action-strategies with respect to two different reliability specifications may
share some common actions. Given a set of admissible action-strategies with respect to various sensed-events, it
is necessary to predict the amount of resources (processors) required in order to execute all of them in a worst-case
scenario when all sensed-events, take place together. This estimation is non-trivial due to the sharing of actions and the
redundancy provisions present in the strategies, and hence the choice of an appropriate admissible action-strategy with
respect to every sensing is a key to reduce the number of resources. This paper presents a novel technique for selecting
and grouping the set of admissible action-strategies attributed from various specifications with respect to different
sensed-events, so that the number of resources needed in the worst case for executing the actions is minimized.
With the rapid growth in the number of features supported in modern appliances, the computing paradigm is shifting
from a federated architecture where each feature runs on a dedicated processor to an integrated architecture where
Electronic Control Units (ECUs) are shared among multiple features. While integrated architectures are able to reduce
the costs of electronics and networking, the scheduling and fault tolerant deployment of control tasks has becomemore
complex. We believe that having an early estimate of the resource requirements, as in the proposed approach, can help
in taking rational decisions on the tradeoff between reliability and resource costs.
Our early work, presented in [16], introduces the formal framework for reliability specification. The problem of esti-
mating resource requirements from such specifications is treated in this paper for the first time. The main contributions
of this paper are as follows:
• We extract all possible admissible reliability strategies from a given reliability specification, that meets the
desired reliability target for a functional specification.
• We formulate the resource optimization problem in terms of a constraint-satisfaction problem which can be
solved using SMT / ILP solvers.
• We have studied the proposed technique over test-cases from automotive domain and also shown the scala-
bility of our approach over several experiments.
• We illustrate the practicality of our proposed technique using a case-study (over Satellite Launch Vehicle
Navigation, Guidance and Control (NGC) System) from avionics domain.
It is important to note that resource estimation is intricately related to the code volumes associated with the control
tasks and their worst case execution times (WCET) on the chosen ECUs. In practice, the design of embedded systems
is a process that goes through multiple generations of a product, and statistical knowledge about the execution times
and the probability of their success in terms of providing the desired outcome are available from legacy data. Therefore
early estimation of the tradeoff between functional reliability and resource requirements is feasible in practice, though
not in established practice today.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 illustrates the preliminary concepts and the earlier works carried out to
set up the premise for this work. In Section 3, we present the formal problem definition and methods to determine
the optimal number of resources. The experimental results showing the efficacy of our proposed framework is given
in Section 4. In Section 5, we demonstrate our proposed methodology using a practical case-study. Finally, Section 6
concludes the paper with a brief discussion on the ramifications of the proposed approach.
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2 Background Work and Preliminaries
An embedded controller of a CPS comprises of three primary modules, namely Sensor, Controller and Actuator –
which interacts with the Plant (or the environment) to perform desired behaviors. The sensor is responsible for sensing
input scenarios from the plant (or the environment). The controller performs the control decision based on the sensed
input. The actuator delivers actuation signals to the plant (or the environment). Some of the activities in CPS control
may be implemented using software and the rest may be controlled via hardware. For example, sensing a scenario
where the brake should be applied automatically, the computation of appropriate brake-pressure may be carried out
using a software program. However, maintaining the same break-pressure for a certain amount of time is performed
by a hardware-control. The resultant outcome while applying such actions is the application of the wheel-brakes and
thereby reduction in the vehicle speed. We present a formal model for embedded CPS and such requirements in the
following.
Figure 1 provides a schematic representation of the embedded CPS framework. Here, the events that are responsible
for sensing inputs, actions (actuations) and outcome activities are termed as sensed-events (EI ), action-events (EA) and
outcome-events (EO), respectively. While interacting with the plant model, the controller receives the sensed-events
and compute appropriate actions/actuations to produce the desired outcome-events. The outcome of an action may
take place after many control cycles and may also be durable over a period of time. Typically, the control software
execution platform is responsible to compute appropriate actuations for the desired outcomes being enabled.
Action
Strategy
Control Software
Execution Platform
Sense
Plant (M)Controller (C)
CPS
Outcome
Action
PSfrag replacements
EI
EA
EO
Figure 1: Schematic Representation of the Embedded CPS Framework
The reliability of the CPS is governed by the fault-free execution from sensed to the outcome events. This intuitively
means, after sensing an input scenario, how reliably an action (actuations) can be performed once the controller
decision is undertaken properly. In this model, the reliability of the outcome activities are attributed from the unreliable
computational platform where the action events are scheduled, computed and applied. To meet the desired reliability
of the outcome behavior, the fine-grain control incorporates various physical redundancy attributes in the scheduled
actions inside the control execution platform. It may be noted that the unreliability lies primarily in the execution of
action-events (as per our model), though there can also be failures in the sensing and application of outcome activities
or imperfections in message communications. However, this framework can be suitably extended to handle such
uncertainties in other components of the embedded CPS framework.
From an abstract point of view, the activities of a CPS can be visualized in terms of sequence of events. The early-
stage functional specification narrates the outcome-event based on a sensed scenario which is to be met with specific
reliability targets. Such specifications describe the correctness requirements for a CPS. In addition to this, the meta-
level action-strategy specifies the supervisory control orchestrated by the control software where the redundancies in
actions are described for a sensed scenario. Such requirements are termed as CPS reliability specifications [16].
Now, let us revisit the formal model for such embedded CPS specifications as introduced in [16] using an elementary
correctness requirement, PS , for the subsystem, S, with a sense-event, EI ∈ EI , and an outcome-event, EO ∈ EO as
follows:
PS : (EI → ##[a : b] EO)
It means that, whenever EI is sensed then the outcome-eventEO is asserted within next a to b time-units
1. Suppose,
EA ∈ EA is the action-event responsible for producing the outcomeEO . If the probability of success forEO given the
successful execution ofEA is expressed as, REO = Prob(EO |EA), then the current reliability (RPS ) of the property,
1The formal expressions of the properties have syntactic (and semantic) similarity with SystemVerilog Assertions (SVA) [42].
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PS , is also REO . Since we have RPS = Prob(EO | EA) ∗ Prob(EA | EI) ∗ Prob(EI), so RPS = REO happens
under the assumption of a perfect sense and action scenario2, where both Prob(EA | EI) = 1 and Prob(EI) = 1.
At the design-level, the controller can leverage spatial and temporal redundancy provisions to improve the reliability
of the outcome-events and thereby enhance the functional reliability of the design specifications. Figure 2(a) and
Figure 2(b) show the schematic models where the spatial and temporal redundancy provisions are incorporated at the
controller level. In the spacial redundancy model for a CPS control system, S, there are n parallel instances of the
controller, namely C1, C2, . . . , Cn and n computational counterparts,M1,M2, . . . ,Mn. The controllersCi, i ∈ [1, n]
sense the same events (EI ∈ EI ) and produce the action-events EA1(t), EA2(t), . . . , EAn(t) (∀i ∈ [1, n], EAi(t) ∈
EA), respectively, at time t. Each action-event EAi goes into a possibly unreliable computational counterpart, Mi,
respectively. On the other hand, in the temporal redundancy model, m number of re-executions are made by a single
controller within the time-window from a to b. At time ti (∀i ∈ [1,m], a ≤ ti ≤ b), the controller, C, senses
same input-event, EI ∈ EI , and produces the action-event, EA(ti) ∈ EA. This action-event goes into the possibly
unreliable computational counterparts, M(ti) (i ∈ [1, n]), and produces an output-event at ti. Finally, the outcome-
event,EO ∈ EO , produces successful (correct) outcome if one of the outputs ofMi (orM(ti)) produces correct result
for both these cases3.
PSfrag replacements
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(b) Temporal Redundancy Model
Figure 2: Redundancy Models of an Embedded CPS Control (adopted from [16])
Such design-level redundancy provisions can be captured from the functional specification-level as well. For example,
we can formally represent the spatial and temporal redundancies (as shown in Figure 2) using the properties, PSrelS
and PTrelS , respectively, as follows:
PSrelS : (EI → ##[a : b] (EA[ ∼ n])) and P
Trel
S : (EI → ##[a : b] (EA[ = m]))
Here, PSrelS asserts that, whenever EI is sensed then the action-event EA is asserted parallelly in n execution units
(denoted by the [∼ n] construct) within next a to b time-units. Similarly, PTrelS asserts that, whenever EI is sensed
then the action-event EA is asserted m times by multiple executions (denoted by the [= m] construct) within next a
to b time-units. At this current setup, the reliability of the outcomes are also increased and these are represented as,
RSrelEO = 1− (1−REO)
n and RTrelEO = 1− (1−REO)
m, respectively.
Let us present an example to explain such functional correctness and reliability specifications.
Example 1 Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) supports features to – (a) maintain a minimum following interval to a lead vehicle in
the same lane and (b) control the vehicle speed whenever any lead obstacle is present. Let us consider the functional requirements
of ACC, which senses the proximity of any lead vehicle and a leading obstacle by the sense-events, lead_gap and lead_obs,
respectively. The required action-events issued by the ACC controller for reducing throttle by 10% and applying proper pressure
in wheel-brakes are denoted as, act1 and act2, respectively. The corresponding outcome-events are given as, thrt_adj and
brk_adj. It may be noted that a single time-unit delay is considered to be of 50 ms in all the functional specifications mentioned
below.
Now, consider the following two functional correctness requirements of ACC as follows:
(a) ACC_C1: As soon as a lead obstacle is sensed, then within a total of 200 ms, the throttle is adjusted (reduced by 10%) followed
by the application of wheel brakes after 50-100 ms. Formally, this property is expressed as:
ACC_C1 : lead_obs → ##[1 : 2] thrt_adj ##[1 : 2] brk_adj
2We assume that the control system senses perfectly (without any false positives or false negatives) and also generates appro-
priate actions based on the sensed-event.
3We assume a fail-silent model here, where failure in any outcome implies discontinuation of that outcome – thereby it will not
interfere with other correct outcomes and can possibly be distinguished from these correct outcomes.
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(b) ACC_C2: Whenever a lead vehicle is sensed in a close proximity, then within a total of 300 ms, the throttle is adjusted (reduced
by 10%) followed by the application of wheel brakes after 50-150 ms. Formally, this property is expressed as:
ACC_C2 : lead_gap → ##[1 : 3] thrt_adj ##[1 : 3] brk_adj
Suppose, the desired reliability of the given correctness requirements be 0.95 and 0.98 for ACC_C1 and ACC_C2, respectively. Here,
the actions act1 and act2 are responsible for producing the outcome-events thrt_adj and brk_adj, respectively. Suppose, the
outcome-events are unreliable and their reliability values are given as:
Rthrt_adj = Prob(thrt_adj | act1) = 0.8 and Rbrk_adj = Prob(brk_adj | act2) = 0.9.
Since the outcomes are unreliable, the ACC must issue the action-events with appropriate redundancy in order to meet the desired
reliability target, as given by the following reliability specifications.
(a) ACC_R1: As soon as a lead obstacle is sensed, then the throttle-reduction action-event is scheduled in two processors parallelly
within 50− 100 ms, followed by the brake-apply action-event which is also scheduled in two processors parallelly within next
50− 100 ms. Formally, this property is expressed as:
ACC_R1 : lead_obs → ##[1 : 2] act1[∼ 2] ##[1 : 2] act2[∼ 2]
(b) ACC_R2: Whenever a lead vehicle is sensed in a close proximity, then the overall action of 10% throttle-reduction applied
successively twice, followed by brake-application in the next time-unit is re-executed twice within an overall time limit of 300
ms. Formally, this property is expressed as:
ACC_R2 : lead_gap → ##[1 : 3] (act1[∗2] ##1 act2)[= 2]
Now, given the reliability specifications, ACC_R1 and ACC_R2 and assuming that the sensed-events (lead_obs and lead_gap) are
present in Cycle-0, the reliability for the correctness specifications, ACC_C1 and ACC_C2 are calculated in Table 1 and Table 2,
respectively, with respect to each action/control strategy4. For example, the reliability computed from Option-(1A) in Table 1 is
given as, [1− (1−Rthrt_adj)
2]× [1− (1−Rbrk_adj)
2] = 0.9504, since there are 2 spatial redundancy provisions for each action
in ACC_R1 with respect to the outcomes of ACC_C1. Similarly, the reliability computed from Option-(2B) in Table 2 is given as,
[1− (1−Rthrt_adj ×Rbrk_adj)
5] = 0.9983, since there are 5 ways to satisfy ACC_C2 from the given action-strategy of ACC_R1.
Table 1: Possible Options of Action-Events for ACC_R1
Possible Action Events (Cycle-wise) Computed
Options Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Reliability
(1A) act1 act2 0.9504
act1 act2
(1B) act1 act2 0.9504
act1 act2
(1C) act1 act2 0.9504
act1 act2
(1D) act1 act2 0.9504
act1 act2
The highlighted rows of Table 1 and Table 2 indicate the action-strategies that meet the desired reliability requirements for both
properties of ACC subsystem. We call all these strategies meeting the reliability targets as the admissible action-strategies. 
3 Reliability-aware Resource Estimation
In this section, we formally present the problem of reliability-aware resource estimation and illustrate the detailed
resource allocation procedure.
3.1 Formal Statement of the Problem
The problem of finding the optimal number of computing resources (processors) considering the simultaneous occur-
rences of a set of sensed-events is formally described as:
Given:
4The method for formal reliability assessment is presented in [16] in details.
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Table 2: Possible Options of Action-Events for ACC_R2
Possible Action Events (Cycle-wise) Computed
Options Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Cycle-6 Reliability
(2A) act1 act1 act2 0.9999
act1 act1 act2
(2B) act1 act1 act2 0.9983
act1 act1 act2
(2C) act1 act1 act2 act1 act1 act2 0.9216
(2D) act1 act1 act2 0.9999
act1 act1 act2
(2E) act1 act1 act2 0.9780
act1 act1 act2
(2F) act1 act1 act2 0.9216
act1 act1 act2
(i) A set of formal correctness and reliability properties of the system,
(ii) Assigned reliability targets with respect to each correctness specification,
(iii) The set of sensed-events that may occur simultaneously, and
(iv) A set of admissible action-strategies corresponding to every sensed-event (derived from the corresponding relia-
bility properties of the system).
Objective: To determine the appropriate choice of action-strategy with respect to every sensed-event so that the overall
resource/processor requirement is minimized.
Assumptions:
(i) Same actions participating under two different action-strategies corresponding to different sensed-events can be
executed together in the same processor.
(ii) Execution of every action takes unit time (one cycle) in the processor.
(iii) Within one action-strategy, the participating actions appear as disjunction-free.
Assumption-(i) prevents this resource optimization problem to have similar behavior as any conventional two-
dimensional strip packing problems [31] and hence we cannot directly apply those solutions here. However, the
solution space is determined by several possible choices of the action-strategy combinations attributing to the varied
number of processors required. The following example illustrated this in details.
Example 2 Let us revisit Example 1 where we derive the admissible action-strategies for the two specifications of ACC subsystem
in the highlighted rows of Table 1 and Table 2.
Suppose, the sensed-events, lead_obs and lead_gap, occur simultaneously at Cycle-0. Then, Table 3 denotes possible execution
options for the action-events combining the both the strategies. For example, if we try to ascertain Options (1A)with (2A), then we
need two processors in Cycle-1 to execute two parallel act1 events among which one act1 event of Option (1A) is shared/paired
with the act1 from Option (2A).
Such action sharing helps us to reduce the number of processor requirements. We find that (1A + 2A) combination requires
4 processors to execute the action strategies. Table 3 presents all the possible combinations and the required resources while
executing each of these combinations of action strategies. It may be noted that, the minimum number of resources (2) is required
when we perform the actions as per the Options (1D) and (2A) for both the properties. Hence, the next challenge is to bind the
action-events with respect to Cycles so that the required resources are minimized. 
3.2 Resource Estimation Procedure
The required number of resources can be computed from a set of admissible action-strategies (corresponding to sensed-
events) derived from the reliability properties of a system, assuming that the corresponding set of sensed-events occur
simultaneously. The minimum count of execution units depends on the optimal allocation of the actions to appropriate
processor cores in every execution time/cycle so as to maximize the sharing of action executions. The entire problem
can be modeled as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) which can be solved by an SMT / ILP solver.
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Table 3: Possible Executions of Action-Events and Required Resources for ACC Subsystem
Strategy Possible Executions of Action-Events (Cycle-wise) Resource
Comb. Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Req.
1A+2A 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act2〉 4
1A+2B 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act1〉 〈act2〉 3
1A+2D 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act2〉 3
1B+2A 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act2〉 3
1B+2B 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1〉 〈act2〉 3
1B+2D 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1〉 〈act1, act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act2〉 4
1C+2A 〈act1〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act2〉 3
1C+2B 〈act1〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1〉 〈act2〉 3
1C+2D 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act1, act2, act2〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act2〉 4
1D+2A 〈act1〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act2, act2〉 2
1D+2B 〈act1〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act2〉 3
1D+2D 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1, act2, act2〉 〈act2〉 3
Figure 3 illustrates the primary steps in this framework. The steps that are involved here are primarily categorized in
two broad parts, namely – 1. Parsing and Action Representation and 2. Constraint Generation.
Reliability
Specifications
Constraint Generation
(a) Timing Constraint Generation
(b) Timing Variable Grouping
(c) Resource Constraint Generation
(d) Auxiliary Constraint Generation Bisection
Iterative Resource
Bound
Parsing and Task Representation
(a) Action Identification
(b) Time Prefix Determination
(d) Timing Variable Creation
(e) Linking Action−Events
(c) Spatial Red. Factor Extraction
SMT / ILP
CSP Solver
Minimum Number
of Core Required
Figure 3: Resource Estimation Framework
1. Parsing and Action Representation
From the reliability properties and the derived action-strategies, the first step is to identify relevant information of
the action-event occurrences, their timing and redundancy related information so that the required constraints can be
derived later. We present various stages of parsing and action representation as follows.
(a) Action Identification: This step identifies the set of action-events from reliability specifications. For reliability
specifications having redundant actions, duplicate action-events are created.
(b) Time Prefix Determination: The time prefix of an action-event, extracted from the reliability specification, is
typically given as either ##t0 (fixed-time) or ##[t1 : t2] (time-range) where t0, t1, t2 ∈ N, the set of all non-
negative integers. The lower and upper bound of the time prefixes are represented using a doublet, 〈t0, t0〉, for the
fixed time prefix and a doublet, 〈t1, t2〉, for representing the variable time prefix. The redundancies are treated as
follows:
• In case of spatial redundancy (m-times), all replicated actions (from 2nd to mth occurrences) have 〈0, 0〉 as
the time-prefix.
• In case of temporal redundancy (k-times), let the time prefix for the first action in the first execution be
extracted as 〈t1, t2〉. Then, the first action of i
th (i ∈ [1, k]) re-executed sequence can start earliest at (t1 + i)
and latest by ∆5 – thereby having 〈(t1 + i),∆〉 as the time-prefix. The time prefixes of the other actions are
extracted from the specification and remain same across all their re-executions.
(c) Spatial RedundancyFactor Extraction: Action-eventswith spatial redundancy ofm are represented by associating
each replication with a spatial redundancy factor from 1 tom. A default spatial redundancy factor of 1 is assigned
to action-events having no spatial redundancy.
(d) Timing Variable Creation: Timing variable represents the time of occurrence of an action-event. For every action-
event identified from the reliability properties, unique timing variables are created for each occurrence (replicated
5∆ is computed from the reliability specification considering the given reliability target of the corresponding correctness prop-
erty. Intuitively, this upper bound in time comes from the fact that delaying the start (beyond ∆) in re-executing the same sequence
reduces the number of possible satisfaction of the correctness property and hence the specified reliability remains unmet (Litera-
ture [16] provides more details).
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or re-executed) of that action, which will be used to derive the constraints relating to the time of execution of these
action-events.
(e) Linking Action-Events: For every action-event appearing in the reliability specification, the timing-related con-
straints will be generated either from the absolute time of its occurrence or in relative to the timing of its preceding
event. Hence, we need to map each timing variable (corresponding to an action-event) to the timing variable of its
preceding action – thereby aiding to the generation of timing constraints for action-event sequences with respect
to an action-strategy. The first action-event in the reliability specification is not linked to any other events, since it
depends only on the time of occurrence of the sensed-event. Hence, the timing variable corresponding to the first
action-event has its linked variable as φ. For redundancies, the action-event links are done as follows:
• In case of spatial redundancy (m-times), all replicated actions (from 2nd tomth occurrences) are linked with
the first occurrence of that action.
• In case of temporal redundancy (k-times), the first action in the ith re-execution (i ∈ [1, k]) is linked with the
first action in the (i− 1)th re-execution.
These stages of parsing and action representation are illustrated in details through Example 3.
Example 3 Consider the reliability specifications, ACC_R1 and ACC_R2, with their corresponding correctness specifications,
ACC_C1 and ACC_C2, as given in Example 1. Table 4(a) and Table 4(b) show the information extracted for these properties af-
Table 4: Action-event Information extracted after Parsing and Action Representation Stages
(a) Action-event Information Extracted for ACC_R1
Action Time Pref. Sp.-Red. Factor Time Var. Link Var.
act1 〈1, 2〉 1 τ11 φ
act1 〈0, 0〉 2 τ12 τ11
act2 〈1, 2〉 1 τ13 τ12
act2 〈0, 0〉 2 τ14 τ13
†∆ is computed from ACC_R2 w.r.t. the reliability targets of ACC_C2
(b) Action-event Information Extracted for ACC_R2
Action Time Pref. Sp.-Red. Factor Time Var. Link Var.
act1 〈1, 3〉 1 τ21 φ
act1 〈1, 1〉 1 τ22 τ21
act2 〈1, 1〉 1 τ23 τ22
act1 〈1,∆†〉 1 τ24 τ21
act1 〈1, 1〉 1 τ25 τ24
act2 〈1, 1〉 1 τ26 τ25
ter parsing and action representation stages, assuming that the sensed-events, lead_obs and lead_gap, for the properties happen
together at time t = 0. 
2. Constraint Generation
Primarily, the set of generated constraints can be of the following two types – (i) timing-related constraints, and (ii)
resource-related constraints. However, the detailed stages, needed to derive these constraints to be used by the CSP
solver, are given below.
(a) Timing Constraint Generation: Given a reliability specification, Speci, let the timing variable corresponding to
an action, actj, be τix. It has the time-prefix 〈t
1
x, t
2
x〉 and is linked with another action, actk, having the timing
variable as τiy (y < x). Then, the timing constraints for τix are,
τix ≥
{
t1x, if τiy = φ
τiy + t
1
x, otherwise
and τix ≤
{
t2x, if τiy = φ
τiy + t
2
x, otherwise
(1)
If t1x = t
2
x, then the timing constraint is simplified as,
τix =
{
t1x, if τiy = φ
τiy + t
1
x, otherwise
(2)
(b) Timing Variable Grouping:
Timing variable are grouped to enable resource minimization through its sharing. Variables corresponding to same
action are grouped together and corresponding to every action, at least one group is formed. Given two reliability
specifications, Speci and Specj, having a common action, actk, let the timing variables corresponding to actk,
be τix and τjy , respectively. Then, we can put τix and τjy together forming one group, Gl, i.e., τix, τjy ∈ Gl. It
may be noted that, all the timing variables belonging to one group, say Gl, are associated with the same action-
event, say actk, from different properties. Here, actk can also be the first occurrence of an action being replicated
m-times (spatial redundancy).
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Moreover, in case of spatial redundancy (say, action acts in Speci is replicated m-times), the timing variables,
τis2 , τis3 , . . . , τism , corresponding to every replicated action (2
nd to mth occurrence) forms a singleton group,
i.e., Gl2 = {τis2},Gl3 = {τis3}, . . . ,Glm = {τism}. Now, if acts exists in another specification, Specj, with
spatial redundancy n-times, then the grouping varies, depending on the relative values of n andm:
• If n ≤ m, then Glk = Glk ∪ {τjsk} (∀k ∈ [1, n]).
• If n > m, then Glk = Glk ∪ {τjsk} (∀k ∈ [1,m]) and singleton groups, Glk = {τjsk} (∀k ∈ [m+ 1, n]).
(c) Resource Constraint Generation: Pairing of timing variables into groups helps us to generate resource constraints
such that, if τik1 , τjk2 ∈ Gl then the corresponding actions (say, actk1 from Speci and actk2 from Specj) are
same, i.e. actk1 = actk2 . So, these actions can be executed once whenever possible – resulting in a reduction
in the execution resources (processors). Let an action-event, executing at cycle-t, be represented using the timing
variable τij ; then the required resource due to the execution of only that action is given as,
countt(τij) =
{
1, if τij = t
0, otherwise
The number of resources required at Cycle-t by the group of timing variables representing an action is denoted
as,
countt(Gl) =
{
1, if ∃τij ∈ Gl, such that τij = t
0, otherwise
Suppose we are given with n specifications, Spec1, Spec2, . . ., Specn. We choose all timing variables belonging
to each Speci (i ∈ [1, n]) from the group,
Gl = {τ1x1 , τ1y1 , . . . , τ2x2 , τ2y2 , . . . , τnxn , τnyn , . . .}
and create n sub-groups of Gl as,
SiGl = {τixi , τiyi , . . .}, ∀i ∈ [1, n]
Now, the required resource count for each of these sub-groups, SiGl , is denoted as,
countt(SiGl) =
∑
∀τij∈SiGl
countt(τij)
The sub-group count indicates the number of coincident action-events belonging to the same specification (implied
by temporal redundancy). Hence, we indicate the total number of resources required at Cycle-t to execute the
actions from these n sub-groups of Gl as,
counttSUB(Gl) = MAX
1≤i≤n
[countt(SiGl)]
Let all the timing variables corresponding to the action-event, actk, appear inm groups, Gl1 , Gl2 , . . ., Glm . Then,
we define,
counttSUP(Glj ) =
m∑
j=1
countt(Glj ), ∀j ∈ [1,m]
A pertinent point to note here is that, for a group, Gl, if there is no temporal redundancy involved (in the spec-
ification) for the representative action of that group, then we find, [counttSUB(Gl) − count
t
SUP(Gl)] ≤ 0 and the
required resources at Cycle-t becomes, countt =
∑
l count
t(Gl). Hence, the generated resource constraint for
Cycle-t is derived as follows:
countt =


∑
∀l
countt(Gl) ; if [count
t
SUB(Gl)− count
t
SUP(Gl)] ≤ 0∑
∀l
[countt(Gl) + {count
t
SUB(Gl)− count
t
SUP(Gl)}] ; otherwise
(3)
(d) Auxiliary Constraint Addition: Two types of auxiliary (additional) constraints are derived to make the constraint
generation process complete. These are discussed below.
• Admissibility Constraint: We have noticed in Section 2 that, among all the action-strategies that are generated
from a reliability specification with respect to the given reliability target of its corresponding correctness
property, there is a subset of action-strategies which are admissible. Let us assume that the last execution
of an action-event can happen latest at Cycle-T such that all action-strategies remain admissible. Then, we
need to add a constraint with respect to the timing variable, τij , corresponding to the last executed action as,
τij ≤ T
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• Resource Limit Constraint: We start with a pessimistic bound on the number of resources required and
gradually refine that limit. For a given choice of maximum number of resources, Γ ∈ N, these constraints are
expressed as,
countt ≤ Γ, ∀t ∈ [1, T ]
All these generated constraints can also be used in a constraint optimization tool/solver (like ILP solvers). There, we
need to add the additional objective function providing the minimization or maximization requirement. Since we are
minimizing the number of resources (processors) in this case, the objective function will be:
minimize(Γ)
Example 4 Let us revisit Table 4 generated in Example 3 and derive the required set of constraints.
• Timing Constraints: The timing constraints with respect to the property, ACC_R1, are derived as:
τ11 ≥ 1; τ11 ≤ 2; τ13 ≥ τ12 + 1; τ13 ≤ τ12 + 2; τ12 = τ11 + 0; τ14 = τ13 + 0
Similarly, the timing constraints with respect to the property, ACC_R2, are derived as:
τ21 ≥ 1; τ21 ≤ 2; τ22 = τ21+1; τ23 = τ22+1; τ24 ≥ τ21+1; τ24 ≤ τ21+∆; τ25 = τ24+1; τ26 = τ25+1
Now, ∆ = 2 is extracted from the logical satisfaction of ACC_C2 using ACC_R2 subject to specific reliability targets.
• Timing Variable Groups: The timing variables for each action-events is grouped as follows:
G1 = {τ11, τ21, τ22, τ24, τ25}; G2 = {τ12}; G3 = {τ13, τ23, τ26}; G4 = {τ14}
Here, all the timing variables present in the groups G1 and G2 correspond to act1 action-event and that are present in the
groups G3 and G4 correspond to act2 action-event.
• Resource Constraints: The resource constraints are derived using Table 5 for each Cycle-t. Finally, we produce the
following constraints (∀t ∈ [1, 5]):
count
t =


4∑
l=1
countt(Gl) ; if [count
t
SUB(Gl)− count
t
SUP(Gl)] ≤ 0
4∑
l=1
[countt(Gl) + {count
t
SUB(Gl)− count
t
SUP(Gl)}] ; otherwise
Table 5: Resource Constraint Generation (for Cycle-t)
Groups countt(Gl) count
t(S1Gl) count
t(S2Gl) count
t
SUP(Gl)
G1
(τ11 == t) ∨ (τ21 == t)∨
(τ22 == t) ∨ (τ24 == t) ∨ (τ25 == t)
(τ11 == t)
(τ21 == t) + (τ22 == t)+
(τ24 == t) + (τ25 == t)
countt(G1) + count
t(G2)
G2 (τ12 == t) (τ12 == t) 0 count
t(G1) + count
t(G2)
G3 (τ13 == t) ∨ (τ23 == t) ∨ (τ26 == t) (τ13 == t) (τ23 == t) + (τ26 == t) count
t(G3) + count
t(G4)
G4 (τ14 == t) (τ14 == t) 0 count
t(G3) + count
t(G4)
• Auxiliary Constraints: The admissibility constraint, here, restricts the last action-event, act2, to happen latest by 5th-
cycle, i.e. T = 5 (Refer to Table 4 of Example 3 for admissible action-strategies). Hence, we add, τ26 ≤ 5.
Suppose, we set the resource limits as Γ = 2, then the added constraints are as follows:
count
1 ≤ 2, count2 ≤ 2, count3 ≤ 2, count4 ≤ 2, count5 ≤ 2
If we fed all the above constraints together in a SMT/ILP solver, then we find the following satisfiable valuation of the variables:
τ11 = 2, τ12 = 2, τ13 = 4, τ14 = 4,
τ21 = 1, τ22 = 2, τ23 = 3, τ24 = 2, τ25 = 3, τ26 = 4.
It indicates that, both act1 and act2 of ACC_R1 is replicated twice in Cycle-2 and Cycle-4, respectively. Two consecutive act1
followed by act2 of ACC_R2 is executed for the first time in Cycle-1, Cycle-2 and Cycle-3, respectively. Again, re-execution of
the same sequence happens when two consecutive act1 followed by act2 is executed for the second time in Cycle-2, Cycle-3
and Cycle-4, respectively. This result is also evident from Example 3, where the choice of Options (1D) + (2A) produces this
outcome as shown in Table 3. 
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The resource constraints and the timing constraints are fed together to a SMT solver to check the satisfiability. If these
constraints can be satisfied, then we conclude that the given resource limit, Γ, is sufficient for the admissible action
strategies to be scheduled. However, an unsatisfiable outcome denotes that the resource limit needs further increment.
To solve this using an ILP solver, we also add the objective constraint (for minimization).
Now, to derive the optimal (minimum) number of required resources, we start from a pessimistic limit and proceed on
iteratively bisecting the limit (in a similar manner as done in binary search technique) until we converge into finding
the minimum value of the resource limit. To illustrate the procedure, let us assume that we start with a given Γ = 4 in
our example and derive the satisfiable valuations. Then, we bisect the limit and make Γ = ⌊ (1+4)2 ⌋ = 2 and still we
can derive satisfiable valuations as illustrated in Example 4. Next, when we further bisect and make Γ = ⌊ (1+2)2 ⌋ = 1,
then the constraints become unsatisfiable. Hence, we conclude that the minimum number of resources required to
execute the admissible strategies is 2.
4 Experimental Results
In this section, the experimental results performed to check the scalability of this approach on an 8-Core Intel Xeon
Ivy bridge E5 − 2650v2 series processor (20M Cache, 2.60GHz) with 4 × 8GB RAM are presented. Figure 4
and 5 shows the 3D plots on the scalability experiments performed. We have used Z3 SMT solver [36] developed
by Microsoft Corporation and CPLEX Optimizer (ILP solver) [19] developed by IBM. The time response of the
proposed approach subject to varying sequential depth6 and number of action-events were analyzed. The graphs
depict exponential increase in execution time in determining the optimal resources as the sequential depth of the
specifications increase. The time response with varying number of properties and varying number of action-events per
property are also studied. This response also has exponential behavior as indicated in Figures 4-5.
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Figure 4: 3D Graphs for Scalability Experiments over Sequential Depth of Specifications
In Figure 4, the responses of Z3 and CPLEX solvers are shown with respect to the variations in sequential depth of
the properties. The Z-axis in all the graphs represents the time required to find the minimum number of resources in
Micro-seconds. The X-axis indicates the sequential depth (varied upto 2000 time units) and the Y-axis indicates the
number of action-events in the specification (varied upto 50). For smaller sequential depth, the variation in execution
time with variation in the number of action-events is rather small. However, as the sequential depth increases, the
execution time varies rapidly as the number of action-events increases. The increases in sequential depth also results
in the increase in number of resource constraints. Moreover, the increase in number of action-events results in increase
in the length and complexity of resource constraints as well. But for same number of action events, the number of
timing constraints remains the same. The increase in number of resource constraints has higher impact in the increase
of execution time than the increase in the length of resource constraints.
In Figure 5, the response of Z3 and CPLEX solvers are shown with respect to the variations in the number of spec-
ifications. The Z-axis in all the graphs represents the time required to find the minimum number of resources in
6The sequential depth of a property is the maximum number of cycles throughout which the property may span.
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Figure 5: 3D Graphs for Scalability Experiments over Number of Specifications
Micro-seconds. The X-axis indicates the number of specifications (varied from 0 to 200/500) and the Y-axis indi-
cates the number of action-events per specification (varied upto 80/100). For smaller number of specifications, the
variation in the execution time with the variation in number of action-events is rather small. However, as the number
of specifications increases, the execution time varies rapidly. Here, the increase along the X-axis and Y-axis results
in increase in the number of timing constraints. This increase in number of timing constraints can result in increase
of the number of action-events and the number of specifications. There will be variation in the number of resource
constraints, implied by both increase in the number of action-events as well as in the number of properties, since time
of execution can vary in both these cases. Both X-axis and Y-axis has similar effects in increasing the length and
number of resource constraints. Thus, the behavior is truly exponential in this case. The increase in timing constraints
have lesser effect on the time of execution than the increase in the length/complexity of the resource constraints.
Comparison of Results obtained by Constraint Solvers (Z3 and CPLEX)
It may be noted that, when modeling our resource estimation problem as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) or
a Constraint Optimization Problem (COP), there are two types of constraints to be considered. The first type is the
timing constraints that define definite timing relationship between the action-events constituting the feasible action-
event strategies meeting specific reliability targets. The second type is the resource constraint, this restraint is to be
kept on all viable time value or the maximum depth of time over which the action strategy can exist assuming the
sensed-event corresponding to the reliability specifications happens at time zero.
Both the solvers, Z3 (CSP solver) [36] and CPLEX (ILP/COP solver) [19] will share the same timing and resource
constraints. However, ILP requires an objective function to be provided in addition to the constraints presented to Z37.
We can check the satisfiability of the given set of reliability specifications with respect to any specific number of cores
using Z3 [5]. In CPLEX, the objective function is defined as the sum of the number of time cycles where the resource
constraints are met and maximization of the same can result in the optimal satisfiable solution to the problem [35].
Hence, we are finding an assignment that maximizes the number of satisfied resource constraints in ILP to model the
problem.
Comparing the performance of the Z3 solver with the CPLEX solver, the CPLEX is significantly faster in both sce-
narios. The primary reason behind this behavior is the fact that CPLEX ILP solver is a COP solver [29]. The search
space of the ILP solver is limited to the optimal hyper-plane which maximizes the objective function and hence the
ILP solver will be faster in reaching the minimum number of resources. The calculation of the optimal plane offsets
the difference slightly, still there is an appreciable variation in execution time between two solvers.
5 Case-Study: Navigation, Guidance and Control (NGC) System for Satellite Launch
Vehicles
The satellite launch vehicle navigation, guidance and control (NGC) system is responsible for directing the propulsive
forces and stabilizing the vehicle to achieve the orbit with the specified accuracy. The dispersions in propulsion pa-
rameters compared to expected values, variations of the estimated aerodynamic characteristics during the atmospheric
flight phase, the fluctuating winds both at ground and upper atmosphere and a variety of internal and external distur-
7In general, the objective function is either a cost function or energy function which is to be minimized, or a reward function or
utility function, which is to be maximized.
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bances during the flight can increase the loads on the vehicle beyond the permissible limit and also cause deviations
in the vehicle trajectory from its intended path [41]. Under such environment, NGC system has to define the optimum
trajectory in real time to reach the specified target and steer the vehicle along the desired path and inject the spacecraft
into the mission targeted orbit within the specified dispersions while ensuring the vehicle loads remain within limits.
NGC system is among the most crucial and challenging field in launch vehicle design. The objectives of a satellite
launch vehicle NGC system include:
1. Stabilization of the vehicle during its flight against various disturbance forces and moments due to aerody-
namics, thrust misalignment, separation, liquid slosh, etc.
2. Tracking the desired attitude of the vehicle so as to follow the desired trajectory with the specified accuracy
to meet the final mission objectives.
3. Receiving navigation data from sensors (navigation sensors) and desired attitude from guidance system and
generating appropriate control commands.
Using the control commands generated by the autopilot system, the actuation system generates the necessary forces
and moments to control and stabilize the vehicle as per the requirements. The inputs to the launch vehicle autopilot
system are – navigation sensor data and health status, guidance data and health status, sequencing command execution
status, feedback from vehicle autopilot filters, and feedback fromAutopilot on the status of computation and validation.
5.1 Correctness Specifications
The list of correctness specifications8 for NGC system are expressed formally as follows:
(1) NGCS_C1: If the system detects permanent navigation sensor failure in all channels, then the system will discard navigation
sensor data within 20-40 ms, followed by switching to open loop guidance within 20-60 ms and then initialize the salvage
profile for control within 20-60 ms.
NGCS_C1 : sensor_failure_full → ##[1 : 2] discard_sensor_data
##[1 : 3] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 3] salvage_profile_init
(2) NGCS_C2: If the system detects permanent failure in one of the navigation sensor channels, then the system discards failed
channel within 20-60 ms, followed by recalculation of navigation parameters from redundant channels within 20-40 ms.
NGCS_C2 : sensor_failure_partial → ##[1 : 3] discard_error_ch
##[1 : 2] recal_navig_param
(3) NGCS_C3: If the system detects off-nominal navigation parameters from navigation software and the navigation sensors being
healthy, then the system discards present parameters within 20-40 ms, followed by recalculation of navigation parameters
within 20-80 ms.
NGCS_C3 : off_nominal_param → ##[1 : 2] discard_pre_navig_param
##[1 : 4] recal_navig_param
(4) NGCS_C4: If the system detects guidance algorithm failure, then the system will discard present guidance computations within
20-60 ms, followed by switching to open loop guidance within 20-60 ms, followed by salvage profile initialization for control
within 20-40 ms.
NGCS_C4 : guid_alg_failure → ##[1 : 3] discard_present_comp
##[1 : 3] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 2] salvage_profile_init
(5) NGCS_C5: If the system detects off-nominal values for one of the guidance parameters with the guidance algorithm being
healthy, then the system discards and flushes out the present computation within 20 ms, followed by recalculation within 20-40
ms.
NGCS_C5 : guid_comp_error → ##1 discard_present_comp
##[1 : 2] recal_guid_param
(6) NGCS_C6: If the system detects error in the execution of vehicle autopilot commands, then the system switches to open loop
guidance within 20-60 ms, followed by salvage profile initialization for control within 20-80 ms.
NGCS_C6 : comm_exec_error → ##[1 : 3] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 4] salvage_profile_init
8It is to be noted that a single time-unit delay is considered to be of 20 ms in all the above mentioned correctness specifications.
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(7) NGCS_C7: If the system detects any failure in switching Vehicle Autopilot digital filters, then the system switches to open loop
guidance within 20-100 ms, followed by salvage profile initialization for control within 20-60 ms.
NGCS_C7 : filter_switch_fail → ##[1 : 5] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 3] salvage_profile_init
(8) NGCS_C8: If the system detects non-execution of sequencing(time-based) commands for the first time, then the system re-
schedule time-based commands within 20-60 ms, followed by rechecking the execution status within 20-80 ms.
NGCS_C8 : seq_comm_non_exe → ##[1 : 3] reschedule_seq_comm
##[1 : 4] recheck_seq_comm_exec_status
(9) NGCS_C9: If the system detects non-execution of sequencing(time-based) commands more than once, then the system will switch
to open loop guidance within 20-140 ms.
NGCS_C9 : seq_comm_non_exe → ##[1 : 7] switch_to_open_loop
(10) NGCS_C10: If the system detects error in on board arithmetic computation unit, then the system discards all computations
within 20-40 ms, followed by switching to open loop guidance within 20-80ms, followed by salvage profile initialization for
control within 20-60ms.
NGCS_C10 : onboard_comp_error → ##[1 : 2] discard_present_comp
##[1 : 4] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 3] salvage_profile_init
(11) NGCS_C11: If the system detects off-normal control parameters with the control algorithm being healthy then the system will
recalculate guidance parameters within 20-60 ms, followed by the recalculation of control parameters within 20− 60ms.
NGCS_C11 : abnormal_control_param → ##[1 : 3] recal_guid_param
##[1 : 3] recal_control_param
(12) NGCS_C12: If the system detects any communication error between navigation, guidance, control or sequencing then the
system will switch to open loop guidance within 20-120 ms, followed by salvage profile initialization for control within 20-60
ms.
NGCS_C12 : communication_error → ##[1 : 6] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 3] salvage_profile_init
(13) NGCS_C13: If the system detects temporary failure in any of the navigation sensor channels then the system will discard sensor
data within 20-40 ms, followed by the recalculation of navigation parameters using the redundant channels within 20− 80ms.
NGCS_C13 : sensor_ch_temp_failure → ##[1 : 2] discard_sensor_data
##[1 : 4] recal_navig_param
(14) NGCS_C14: If the system has any temporary failure reported in any of the navigation sensor channels then the system will
recheck the particular channel values for re-induction within 20-160 ms.
NGCS_C14 : sensor_ch_temp_failure → ##[1 : 8] recheck_error_ch
(15) NGCS_C15: If the system detects any timing failure due to shift in clock frequency then the system will discards all computations
within 20-40 ms, followed by switching to open loop guidance within 20-60 ms, followed by salvage profile initialization for
control within 20-60 ms.
NGCS_C15 : clock_freq_shift → ##[1 : 2] discard_present_comp
##[1 : 3] switch_to_open_loop
##[1 : 3] salvage_profile_init
5.2 Reliability Specifications
Table 6 outlines various activities of NGC system and the corresponding outcome-events responsible for that. Also,
the respective action-events for each outcome event and the reliability values for the outcomes, i.e. Routcome-event =
Prob(outcome-event | action-event), are specified.
In addition to this, let us assume that the desired reliability of all the given correctness requirements be 0.992. Since
the outcomes are unreliable, the NGC system must issue the action-events with appropriate redundancy in order to
meet the desired reliability target, as expressed formally by the following reliability specifications9.
9It is to be noted that a single time-unit delay is considered to be of 20 ms in all the above mentioned reliability specifications.
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Table 6: Action-events Corresponding to the Outcome-Events of NGC system and their Reliability Values
Event Description Outcome-Event Action-Event Reliability Values
switching to open loop guidance switch_to_open_loop act1 Rswitch_to_open_loop = 0.985
initialization of salvage profile for control salvage_profile_init act2 Rsalvage_timing_init = 0.984
discarding error channel discard_error_ch act3 Rdiscard_error_ch = 0.985
recalculation of navigation parameters recal_navig_param act4 Rrecal_navig_param = 0.983
discarding previous navigation parameters discard_pre_navig_param act5 Rdiscard_pre_navig_param = 0.986
discarding present computations discard_present_comp act6 Rdiscard_present_comp = 0.996
rescheduling sequencing commands reschedule_seq_comm act7 Rreschedule_seq_comm = 0.982
rechecking sequencing command execution status recheck_seq_comm_exec_status act8 Rrecheck_seq_comm_exec_status = 0.986
recalculating control parameters recal_control_param act9 Rrecal_control_param = 0.982
discarding sensor data discard_sensor_data act10 Rdiscard_sensor_data = 0.996
rechecking error channel recheck_error_ch act11 Rrecheck_error_ch = 0.982
recalculating guidance parameters recal_guid_param act12 Rrecal_guid_param = 0.996
(1) NGCS_R1: As soon as the navigation sensor permanent failure is detected in all the channels, the navigation sensor data is
discarded within 20-40 ms followed by scheduling the switching to open loop guidance action-event in two processors parallelly
within 20-60 ms, followed by the salvage profile initialization action which is also scheduled in two processors parallelly within
next 20-60 ms.
NGCS_R1 : sensor_failure_full → ##[1 : 2] act10 ##[1 : 3] act1[∼ 2] ##[1 : 3] act2[∼ 2]
(2) NGCS_R2: As soon as the system detects permanent failure in one of the navigation sensor channels, system does the action cor-
responding to discarding failed channel within 20-40 ms followed by initiating the action to recalculate navigation parameters
from redundant channels within 20-60 ms. The latter action is repeated consecutively twice.
NGCS_R2 : sensor_failure_partial → ##[1 : 2] act3 ##[1 : 3] act4[∗2]
(3) NGCS_R3: As soon as the system detects off-nominal navigation parameters from navigation software and the navigation
sensors being healthy, system initiates action to discard present parameters within 20-40 ms followed by recalculation action
to calculate navigation parameters within 20-40 ms. The second action is repeated consecutively twice.
NGCS_R3 : of_normal_param → ##[1 : 2] act5##[1 : 2] act4[∗2]
(4) NGCS_R4: whenever the system detects guidance algorithm failure, system will perform action corresponding to discard present
guidance computations within 20-40 ms followed by switching to open loop guidance action within 20-40 ms followed by
salvage profile initialization for control within 20-40 ms. The latter two actions are repeated non-consecutively twice.
NGCS_R4 : guid_alg_failure → ##[1 : 2] act6 ##[1 : 2] (act1 ##[1 : 2] act2)[= 2]
(5) NGCS_R5: whenever the system detects off-nominal values for one of the guidance parameters with the guidance algorithm be-
ing healthy, system does the action corresponding to discarding the present computation within 20 ms followed by recalculation
action within 20-40 ms.
NGCS_R5 : guid_comp_error → ##1 act6 ##[1 : 2] act12
(6) NGCS_R6: As soon as the system detects error in the execution of vehicle autopilot commands, then the system initiates the
action to switch to open loop guidance within 20-40 msfollowed by salvage profile initialization action for control within 20-60
ms. Both the actions are spatially repeated twice.
NGCS_R6 : comm_exec_error → ##[1 : 2] act1[∼ 2] ##[1 : 3] act2[∼ 2]
(7) NGCS_R7: As soon as the system detects any failure in switching Vehicle Autopilot digital filters, then the overall action to switch
to open loop guidance is scheduled within 20-60 ms followed by salvage profile initialization action for control is scheduled
20-40 ms, is repeated non-consecutively twice.
NGCS_R7 : filter_switch_fail → ##[1 : 3] (act1##[1 : 2] act2)[= 2]
(8) NGCS_R8: If the system detects non-execution of sequencing(time-based) commands for the first time, system will do action
corresponding to rescheduling of time-based commands within 20-60 ms followed by rechecking action to check the execution
status within 20 ms. The latter action is repeated non-consecutively twice.
NGCS_R8 : seq_comm_non_exe → ##[1 : 3] act7 ##1 act8[= 2]
(9) NGCS_R9: As soon as the system detects non-execution of sequencing(time-based) commands more than once, system will do
action corresponding to switching to open loop guidance within 100 ms non-consecutively twice.
NGCS_R9 : seq_comm_non_exe ##[1 : $] seq_comm_non_exe → ##[1 : 5] act1[= 2]
(10) NGCS_R10: Whenever system detects error in on board arithmetic computation unit, system discards all computations within
20-40 ms followed by action to switch to open loop guidance is executed parallelly in two units within 20-80ms followed by
salvage profile initialization action for control is executed parallelly in two units within 20-60ms.
NGCS_R10 : onboard_comp_error → ##[1 : 2] act6##[1 : 4] act1[∼ 2]##[1 : 3] act2[∼ 2]
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(11) NGCS_R11: If the system detects off-normal control parameters with the control algorithm being healthy system will trigger
action to recalculate guidance parameters within 20-40 ms followed by triggering action to recalculate control parameters
within 20-60ms. The second action is repeated in two parallel units.
NGCS_R11 : abnormal_control_param → ##[1 : 3] act12 ##[1 : 3] act9[∼ 2]
(12) NGCS_R12: As soon as the system detects any communication error between navigation, guidance, control or sequencing, The
system will repeat the overall action to switch to open loop guidance within 20-80 ms followed by salvage profile initialization
for control within 20-40 ms, non-consecutively twice.
NGCS_R12 : communication_error → ##[1 : 4] (act1##[1 : 2] act2)[= 2]
(13) NGCS_R13: If the system detects temporary failure in any of the navigation sensor channels system will do action to discard
sensor data within 20-40 ms followed by the recalculation of navigation parameters is repeated consecutively twice using the
redundant channels within 20-80ms.
NGCS_R13 : sensor_ch_temp_failure → ##[1 : 2] act10 ##[1 : 4] act4[∗2]
(14) NGCS_R14: whenever system has a temporary failure reported in any of the navigation sensor channels then system will do
rechecking action to check the particular channel values for re-induction within 20-120 ms and is repeated non-consecutively
twice.
NGCS_R14 : sensor_ch_temp_failure → ##[1 : 6] act11[= 2]
(15) NGCS_R15: As soon as the system detects timing failure due to shift in clock frequency, system will discards all computations
within 20-40 ms followed by switching to open loop guidance within 20 ms followed by salvage profile initialization for control
within 20-60 ms. The latter two actions are non-consecutively repeated twice.
NGCS_R15 : clock_freq_shift → ##[1 : 2] act6 ##1 (act1##[1 : 3] act2)[= 2]
5.3 Analysis and Discussion
Given the reliability specifications, NGCS_R1 − NGCS_R15 and assuming that the sensed-events are present in
Cycle− 0, the reliability for the correctness specifications, NGCS_C1 − NGCS_C15 can be calculated with respect
to each action/control strategy, in the same way as shown in Example 1. We present two representative tables,
namely Table 7 and Table 8, corresponding to the specifications, NGCS_C4 and NGCS_C13, respectively, to demon-
strate the result10. To illustrate the computation of reliability values, let us analyze one example action strategy,
say (13A), from Table 8 which is defined over the correctness specification, NGCS_C13, and reliability specifica-
tion, NGCS_R13. Here, the realization of NGCS_C13 can happen in two possible ways as per (13A): (i) act10 fol-
lowed by act4 immediately in the next cycle; or (ii) act10 followed by act4 after a gap of one cycle. Since, it is
given that Rdiscard_sensor_data = 0.996 and Rrecal_navig_param = 0.983, therefore the computed reliability becomes,
R
(13A)
NGCS_C13 = 1 − (1 − Rdiscard_sensor_data × Rrecal_navig_param)
2 = 0.9995. The highlighted rows of Table 7 in-
dicate the admissible action-strategies that meet the desired reliability requirements for the property, NGCS_C4 and
NGCS_C13, of NGC subsystem. For example, Table 7 shows that the action strategies, (4A)− (4P ) and (4A∗)− (4H∗)
are admissible with computed reliability values ≥ 0.992, whereas (4I∗) − (4P∗) options do not meet the desired
reliability target.
Our proposed methodology analyzes the given specifications with reliability targets and searches for appropriate allo-
cation of the action-events (cycle-wise) so that the minimum number of resources are required to realize the specifi-
cations. Table 9 shows the cycle-wise allocations for all the action-events (from the reliability specifications of NGC
system) attributing to the minimum resource requirement, assuming simultaneous occurrence of all sensed-events. It
may be noted that, here we need a minimum of three (3) resources to realize the given set of specifications, which is
evident from the last column of Table 9.
Though the simultaneous occurrence of all sensed-events is the pessimistic-case and needs to be analyzed for deriving
the worst-case resource requirements, but in practical scenarios, all the sensed-events may not appear simultane-
ously. If we assume that the only temporary failures (sensed-events corresponding to NGCS_R2, NGCS_R3, NGCS_R5,
NGCS_R8, NGCS_R11, NGCS_R13 and NGCS_R14) would happen simultaneously (failures which would not lead to
the selection of salvage profile) and the remaining sensed-events (corresponding to NGCS_R1, NGCS_R4, NGCS_R6,
NGCS_R7, NGCS_R9, NGCS_R10, NGCS_R12 and NGCS_R15) occurs 7 or more cycles later, the number of resources
required is only two (2) as shown in Tables 10 and Table 11. This is the minimum number of resources required,
assuming all the sensed-events do not occur together.
In addition to this, we also provide Figure 6 and Figure 7 to show how our analysis time and the minimum resource
requirements depend on the increase in temporal and spatial redundancy factors to improve reliability. In Figure 6
10For brevity, we are not showing the tables for all 15 specifications mentioned.
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Table 7: Possible Options of Action-Events for NGCS_R4
Possible Action Events (Cycle-wise) Computed
Options Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Cycle-6 Cycle-7 Cycle-8 Reliability
(4A) act6 act1 act2 0.9959
act1 act2
(4B) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4C) act6 act1 act2 0.9960
act1 act2
(4D) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4E) act6 act1 act2 0.9959
act1 act2
(4F) act6 act1 act2 0.9960
act1 act2
(4G) act6 act1 act2 0.9960
act1 act2
(4H) act6 act1 act2 0.9960
act1 act2
(4I) act6 act1 act2 0.9959
act1 act2
(4J) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4K) act6 act1 act2 0.9960
act1 act2
(4L) act6 act1 act2 0.9959
act1 act2
(4M) act6 act1 act2 0.9959
act1 act2
(4N) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4O) act6 act1 act2 0.9960
act1 act2
(4P) act6 act1 act2 0.9959
act1 act2
(4A∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4B∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4C∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4D∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4E∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4F∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4G∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4H∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9950
act1 act2
(4I∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4J∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4K∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4L∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4M∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4N∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4O∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
(4P∗) act6 act1 act2 0.9653
act1 act2
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Table 8: Possible Options of Action-Events for NGCS_R13
Possible Action Events (Cycle-wise) Computed
Options Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Cycle-6 Cycle-7 Reliability
(13A) act10 act4 act4 0.9995
(13B) act10 act4 act4 0.9995
(13C) act10 act4 act4 0.9995
(13D) act10 act4 act4 0.9790
(13E) act10 act4 act4 0.9995
(13F) act10 act4 act4 0.9995
(13G) act10 act4 act4 0.9995
(13H) act10 act4 act4 0.9790
Table 9: Cycle-wise Action-event Allocation attributing to Minimum Resource Requirement (assuming a reliability
target of 0.992 for all properties and all sensed-events occurring simultaneously)
Reliability Admissible Action Action-event Allocation Schedule
Specification Strategy Index Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Cycle-6 Cycle-7
NGCS_R1 1G act10 act1, act1 act2, act2
NGCS_R2 2E act3 act4 act4
NGCS_R3 3D act5 act4 act4
NGCS_R4 4A∗ act6 act1 act1 act2 act2
NGCS_R5 5B act6 act12
NGCS_R6 6F act1, act1 act2, act2
NGCS_R7 7D∗ act1 act1 act2 act2
NGCS_R8 8K act7 act8 act8
NGCS_R9 9G act1 act1
NGCS_R10 10I act6 act1, act1 act2, act2
NGCS_R11 11I act12 act9, act9
NGCS_R12 12D∗ act1 act1 act2 act2
NGCS_R13 13C act10 act4 act4
NGCS_R14 14Y act11 act11
NGCS_R15 15M act6 act1 act1 act2 act2
Action-event Allocation 〈act3, act6, 〈act1, act1, 〈act1, act7, 〈act2, act4, 〈act2, act2, 〈act9, act9, 〈act8,
(cycle-wise) act10〉 act5〉 act12〉 act8〉 act4〉 act11〉 act11〉
the response of Z3 and CPLEX solvers to variations in number of specifications is shown. The Z-axis in the graphs
represents the time required to find the minimum number of resources in Microseconds. Where as in Figure 7, the
Z-axis indicates the resource requirement predicted by the algorithm. The X-axis indicates the spatial redundancy
artifact incorporated in the reliability specifications (varied from 2 to 10) in all the graphs. The Y-axis indicates the
temporal redundancy artifact incorporated in the reliability specifications (varied from 2 to 10) in all the graphs. As
the redundancy incorporated increases, the execution time varies exponentially. Here the increase along the X-axis
and Y-axis results in increase in number of timing constraints. This increase in number of timing constraints can be
attributed to increase in number of action-events due to increased redundancy. There will be variation in number of
resource constraints, implied by increase in number of action-events.
Comparing the performance of the Z3 solver with the CPLEX solver, the CPLEX is significantly faster in the above
scenario. The CPLEX ILP solver being a COP solver, its search space is limited to the optimal hyper plane which
Table 10: Cycle-wise Action-event Allocation attributing to Minimum Resource Requirement (assuming a reliability
target of 0.992 for all properties and only the sensed-events corresponding to NGCS_R2, NGCS_R3, NGCS_R5, NGCS_R8,
NGCS_R11, NGCS_R13 and NGCS_R14 occurring simultaneously)
Reliability Admissible Action Action-event Allocation Schedule
Specification Strategy Index Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5 Cycle-6 Cycle-7
NGCS_R2 2D act3 act4 act4
NGCS_R3 3D act5 act4 act4
NGCS_R5 5B act6 act12
NGCS_R8 8K act7 act8 act8
NGCS_R11 11I act12 act9, act9
NGCS_R13 13C act10 act4 act4
NGCS_R14 14W act11 act11
Action-event Allocation 〈 act6, 〈 act3, 〈 act7, 〈 act4, 〈 act4, 〈 act9, 〈 act8,
(cycle-wise) act10 〉 act5 〉 act12 〉 act8 〉 act11 〉 act9 〉 act11 〉
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Table 11: Cycle-wise Action-event Allocation attributing to Minimum Resource Requirement (assuming a reliability
target of 0.992 for all properties and only the sensed-events corresponding to NGCS_R1, NGCS_R4, NGCS_R6, NGCS_R7,
NGCS_R9, NGCS_R10, NGCS_R12 and NGCS_R15 occurring simultaneously)
Reliability Admissible Action Action-event Allocation Schedule
Specification Strategy Index Cycle-1 Cycle-2 Cycle-3 Cycle-4 Cycle-5
NGCS_R1 1G act10 act1, act1 act2, act2
NGCS_R4 4A∗ act6 act1 act1 act2 act2
NGCS_R6 6F act1, act1 act2, act2
NGCS_R7 7D∗ act1 act1 act2 act2
NGCS_R9 9G act1 act1
NGCS_R10 10I act6 act1, act1 act2, act2
NGCS_R12 12D∗ act1 act1 act2 act2
NGCS_R15 15M act6 act1 act1 act2 act2
Action-event Allocation (cycle-wise) 〈act6, act10〉 〈act1, act1〉 〈act1〉 〈act2〉 〈act2, act2〉
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Figure 6: Analysis Time when Redundancy Artifacts Incorporated in Reliability Specifications of NGC system
maximizes the objective function making it more efficient. The resource requirement varies linearly as redundancy
incorporated increases. The resource required is a linear function of incorporated redundancy.
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Figure 7: Resource Requirement for Variations in Redundancy Artifacts Incorporated in Reliability Specifications of
NGC system
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6 Conclusion
Early-stage estimation of required resources from formal reliability specifications could be helpful in reducing the cost
of a safety-critical system. This is typically decided at the design time of such systems and often the choice remain
pessimistic by putting additional resources than required. In this work, we propose an algorithm to find the optimum
number of processing resources required to guarantee the reliability target of given specifications. The problem is
modeled as a Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP) or Constraint Optimization Problem (COP) which can be solved
efficiently using an SMT solver or an ILP solver, respectively. Such an analysis is really helpful in safety-critical
embedded system development. The practicality of the proposed method has been shown over the case-studies from
automotive as well as avionics domain. Besides, the scalability experiments reveal the applicability and efficacy of the
proposed method in complex systems.
The work presented here is an enabler for early prediction of computing resources in embedded CPS control systems
based on their reliability requirements. However, it is pertinent to note that this work considers the sense, action and
outcome of events from an abstract (specification) level of system design, and therefore we restrict ourselves without
considering the communication delays between components and other details from this early design stages. Moreover,
scheduling provisions of the action events is also kept as static in order to accurately specify the temporal boundaries
in the specification. In future, we plan to extend the specification and analysis framework to incorporate more realistic
communication delays and may also keep provisions for dynamic scheduling of the events. Such specification-level
extensions will require much improved analysis involving the interference in component-level activities as well. In
addition to this, along with the unreliable computational platform producing outcomes failures, ramifications due to
the unreliable nature of sensed and action event generation also needs to be explored in future for completeness.
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